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THE THIN BLUE LINE FROM CRIME TO 
PUNISHMENT 
ALICE RISTROPH* 
Criminal law scholarship is marked by a sharp fault line separating 
substantive criminal law from criminal procedure.  Philosophical work 
focuses almost exclusively on the substantive side of that line, addressing 
adjudicative procedure (the trial process) rarely and investigative procedure 
(especially police conduct) almost never.  Instead, criminal law theorists 
devote substantial attention to just two questions: what conduct should be 
criminal, and why is punishment justified?  This essay argues that criminal 
law theory cannot adequately address these favored subjects—the definition 
of crime and the justification of punishment—without also addressing the 
enforcement mechanisms that link crimes to punishments.  Specifically, 
philosophers of criminal law cannot continue to ignore the police. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................305 
I. THE PROCESS-THEORY DIVIDE.......................................................310 
II. CRIMINALIZATION AND ENFORCEMENT........................................319 
III. CONDITIONS FOR PUNISHMENT....................................................329 
CONCLUSION......................................................................................333 
INTRODUCTION 
A line can separate, or it can connect.  The contemporary police force is 
sometimes characterized as “the thin blue line” separating civil order from 
violent anarchy.1  In various ways, though, the police also connect civility to 
 
* Professor, Brooklyn Law School. Many of the ideas in this Article served as the basis of a 
Clough Distinguished Lecture in Jurisprudence at Boston College Law School in March 2015.  
I am grateful to Paolo Barrozo and Vlad Perju for inviting me to deliver that lecture, and for 
their feedback on the project in its early stages. Additional thanks to Chad Flanders, Cynthia 
Godsoe, Zach Hoskins, and Eric Miller for helpful discussions and comments. 
1  After a Dallas prosecutor used the phrase “the thin blue line” in closing arguments at a 
1977 trial for the murder of a police officer, filmmaker Errol Morris used the same phrase as 
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violence.  Force is always at the background of police action, so much so that 
classic sociological descriptions of the police focus on their authority and 
readiness to use physical force.2  If actual incidents of police force seem the 
exception rather than the rule, that perception is due in part to efforts to 
narrow the definition of force in the context of policing, excluding ordinary 
tactics like the use of handcuffs.3  Whatever acts the law labels as force or 
violence, there should be little doubt that police secure order through threats 
of superior physical force, and at least sometimes, actual exercises of it.4 
The thin blue line is a link rather than a divider in another important 
sense, too.  Police connect crimes to punishments: they detect and investigate 
and sometimes even facilitate offenses; they identify and arrest suspects.  
Through these activities, police supply prosecutors, courts, and eventually 
prisons with persons to punish.5  Policing is central to the operation of the 
modern criminal law, and yet, it has long been almost entirely ignored by 
criminal law theorists.6 
 
the title of a documentary about the case.  Morris’s title seems tongue-in-cheek; the 
documentary explores claims that police and prosecutorial misconduct caused an innocent man 
to be sentenced to death for the officer’s murder.  THE THIN BLUE LINE (American Playhouse 
1988).  The documentary prompted a Texas court to reexamine the case and eventually set 
aside the conviction.  See J. Michael Kennedy & Daniel Cerone, Conviction Set Aside for Thin 
Blue Line Character, L.A. TIMES, March 2, 1989, at A1. 
2  Egon Bittner, Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police, 
in THE POTENTIAL FOR REFORM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 17, 35 (Herbert Jacob ed., 1974) 
(“[P]olice work consists of coping with problems in which force may have to be used . . .”) 
(emphasis omitted).  
3  The United States Supreme Court has characterized police use of handcuffs as a use of 
force, and handcuffs are typically viewed as force if used by a private individual on another 
person in the course of criminal conduct.  See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 99 (2005) 
(referring to the use of handcuffs as a “use of force”); cf. Pennington v. Rains, 105 F. App’x 
207, 210–211 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing evidence that victim was handcuffed to support a robbery, 
or theft by force, conviction).  But discussions of “police force” usually focus on the use of 
weapons or the infliction of significant pain.  See Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police 
Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182, 1213–14 (2017). 
4  For that reason, analogies between the police and the military are commonplace.  “The 
thin blue line” is a spinoff of “the thin red line,” a phrase once used to describe the British 
army at the Battle of Balaclava in the Crimean War, and now used more broadly to describe a 
vulnerable but resolute military unit.  See R.B. MOWAT, NEW HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN 774–
75 (1921–1922) (“[T]he 93rd stood firm, a ‘thin red line’ two deep, prepared to die where they 
stood . . . .  The Russian cavalry threw itself against the thin red line in vain.”). 
5  Cf. Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. 
L.J. 1435, 1449–52 (2009) (describing the “obstinacy offense,” or pretextual criminal charges 
brought to punish disrespect toward the state); id. at 1502–07 (discussing ways that police can 
manufacture such offenses).  
6  There are a few recent exceptions.  See generally Ian Loader, In Search of Civic Policing: 
Recasting the ‘Peelian’ Principles, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 427 (2016); Eric Miller, Encountering 
Resistance: Contesting Policing and Procedural Justice, U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 295 (2016).  See 
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That inattention would be regrettable at any moment, but it is especially 
troubling at this particular historical juncture.  American criminal law 
broadly, and American policing specifically, face a legitimacy crisis.7  Mass 
incarceration, profound racial and socioeconomic disparities, and the burdens 
of criminal records and collateral consequences, together with high-profile 
and seemingly unnecessary uses of force by police officers, have prompted 
deep criticisms from across the political spectrum.8  At the same time, reform 
has been elusive.9  Never has it been more urgent to develop normative 
frameworks to evaluate and inform criminal justice policies.  And yet, the 
philosophy of criminal law has remained narrowly focused on a few 
questions, and answers, that arose long before the development of the modern 
police force and long before the current crisis of criminal justice.10 
What are these traditional questions, and familiar answers, that continue 
to claim scholars’ attention?  What is the subject of criminal law theory, if 
not the arc from crime to punishment?  It is risky to make generalizations 
about such an expansive field of study, but I think it is fair to say that criminal 
law theory tends to focus on either crimes or punishments in two mostly 
independent inquiries.  About crime, scholars ponder principles of 
criminalization, general rules of liability, and specific definitions of offenses 
and defenses.11  About punishment, the usual questions are ones of normative 
 
also Christopher Beauchamp, Notable Lacunae, 20 GREEN BAG 2d. 307, 307 (2017) (noting 
that if a topic “truly is neglected . . . an affirmative citation is metaphysically challenging”). 
7  See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2011) 
(“[T]he last half of the twentieth century saw America’s criminal justice system unravel.”); 
Monica Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 
2061 (2017) (referring to “the current policing crisis”).  
8  See, e.g., JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR. ET AL., SOLUTIONS: AMERICAN LEADERS SPEAK OUT ON 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Inimai Chettiar & Michael Waldman eds., 2015) (featuring essays calling 
for reform by Joe Biden, Chris Christie, Hillary Clinton, Ted Cruz, Mike Huckabee, Janet 
Napolitano, and Rand Paul, among others). 
9  See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS 2 (2015) (examining “the shortcomings of the dominant penal reform 
strategies” and suggesting that political pathologies are obstacles to meaningful reform); 
Katherine Beckett et al., The End of an Era? Understanding the Contradictions of Criminal 
Justice Reform, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 238, 253–54 (2016) (studying the 
growing discourses of criminal justice reform and identifying political, institutional, and 
cultural barriers to actual change). 
10  See infra Part I.  As should be clear, I use the phrases “philosophy of criminal law” and 
“criminal law theory” interchangeably. 
11  See generally ANDREW ASHWORTH & JEREMY HORDER, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 
(7th ed. 2013); JOHN GARDNER, OFFENCES AND DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW (2007); DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS 
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008).  
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justification: when and how much is punishment justified?12  Notably, state 
agents are mostly absent from both kinds of inquiries.  Of course, the criminal 
law theorist hopes that wise legislators will heed his principles of 
criminalization and that wise sentencers will heed his advice on just 
punishment.  But the agent at the center of most theories of criminalization 
and most theories of punishment is not a public official, but the wrongdoer: 
criminal law theory tends to focus on the private actor and ask when his acts 
should be criminalized and how they should be punished.13  Note the passive 
voice: it is the voice in which criminal law theory all too often speaks.14 
In order for a crime to be punished, of course, it must be detected, 
investigated, and prosecuted.  Or, to rephrase without the passive voice: in 
order for the state to punish conduct that it has defined as criminal, public 
agents must detect, investigate, and prosecute the criminal conduct.  Those 
actions we call the criminal process, usually distinguishing between the 
investigative process, where police are the most important agents of the state, 
and the adjudicative process, where prosecutors and judges are the central 
agents.15  In legal scholarship (and in the standard law school curriculum), 
substantive criminal law, investigative procedure, and adjudicative procedure 
are treated as three separate fields.  To the extent that philosophers of criminal 
law have addressed procedural questions, they have usually focused on 
adjudicative procedure rather than investigative policing.16  But by and large, 
 
12  See e.g., ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM: A LIBERAL THEORY OF PENAL 
JUSTICE (2009); R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS (1986); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING 
JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of 
Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY (1970); 
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968), reprinted in SENTENCING 
93 (Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment 
and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 258 (2008) (noting that the need to justify punishment is 
the “first premise” of most theorists writing on the subject).  
13  See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, A Tale of Two Theories, 28 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 27, 31 
(2009) (“[P]rima facie, all moral wrongs culpably done should be criminalized.”) (emphasis 
in original); Jim Staihar, Proportionality and Punishment, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1211 
(2015) (offering a theory of when and why an offender should “be punished”).  
14  See Alice Ristroph, Just Violence, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1017, 1041 (2014). 
15  See, e.g., Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 
143, 146–47 (2011) (distinguishing investigatory process and adjudicative process).  
16  The most important work in this area is probably Antony Duff et al.’s three-volume The 
Trial on Trial, which explicitly identifies adjudicative procedure as the link between crime 
and punishment.  See 1 ANTONY DUFF ET AL., THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TRUTH AND DUE PROCESS 
(2004); 2 ANTHONY DUFF ET AL., THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: JUDGMENT AND CALLING TO ACCOUNT 
(2006); 3 ANTHONY DUFF ET AL., THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF 
THE CRIMINAL TRIAL (2007).  Notwithstanding Duff’s influential study, which is discussed 
further in Part I below, procedural issues remain at the fringe of the philosophy of criminal 
law.  See generally Paul Roberts, Groundwork for a Jurisprudence of Criminal Procedure, in 
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even the inquiries into adjudicative procedure are marginal discussions, and 
criminal law theory focuses primarily on the substantive criminal law.  
Philosophers, in short, have had relatively little to say about what transpires 
in the days (or months or years) that pass between the commission of an 
offense and the eventual imposition of punishment. 
This Article argues for, and begins to develop, a new and more holistic 
approach to criminal law theory.  My claim is not simply that those interested 
in the philosophy of criminal law should add a new project—theories of 
policing—to their endeavors.17  Instead, I suggest that policing and the law 
of investigative procedure are central (but too often ignored) components of 
the things that criminal law theorists already study: crimes and punishments.  
An adequate philosophical account of principles of criminalization must 
include enforcement considerations: what powers do we give law 
enforcement officials by criminalizing a given type of conduct?  Regrettably, 
theorists have treated the question of what should be criminal as a question 
about what conduct is blameworthy, or what conduct we would like to wish 
out of existence.  But the criminal law is not a “magic wand,” as Doug Husak 
has put it; it doesn’t make harmful or wrongful conduct disappear.18  To 
criminalize is to authorize state agents to use force and coercion against 
persons suspected or convicted of the prohibited conduct, and a theory of 
criminalization must evaluate the role of these official enforcers. 
Similarly, an adequate philosophical defense of punishment must 
address the enforcement process that brings a suspect to his punishers.  To 
evaluate the legitimacy of punishment for a given defendant, we must ask not 
just what the defendant has done, but also whether the state has identified, 
prosecuted, and convicted the defendant within the bounds of legitimate state 
power.  The constable’s blunder, in other words, may well be grounds for the 
criminal to go free.19  But to see that principle (or even to argue against it), 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 380 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) 
(“To the best of my knowledge, there has never been any grand conspiracy to keep Criminal 
Law Theory pure and uncontaminated by criminal procedure scholarship.  Procedural issues 
have simply been ignored by the vast majority of card-carrying criminal law theorists.”). 
17  Philosopher John Kleinig has written notable studies of policing.  See generally JOHN 
KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING (1996).  Elsewhere in criminal law theory, policing 
occasionally receives brief scrutiny as part of a larger survey of criminal justice issues.  See 
generally ANDREW ASHWORTH & MIKE REDMAYNE, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS (4th ed. 2010); 
see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 106–15 (1990); LUCIA ZEDNER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 126–38 (2004).  
18  Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the 
Criminal Sanction, 23 L. & PHIL. 437, 469 (2004). 
19  In an oft-quoted critique of the exclusionary rule, Justice Cardozo complained that it 
allowed “the criminal . . . to go free because the constable has blundered.”  People v. Defore, 
150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).  Cardozo, and most of those who have repeated his quip, 
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criminal law theory must follow the thin blue line. 
Part I of this Article explores briefly the intellectual division of labor 
that has isolated the study of procedure from the philosophy of criminal law.  
Part of the problem, I suggest, has been inadequate attention to the state and 
the various state actors that make punishment happen.  The Article then 
elaborates on some specific implications of a more integrated approach that 
places criminal law in political context, in part by drawing upon political 
theory and its analysis of state institutions.  Part II argues that consideration 
of police authority is essential to principles of criminalization.  For example, 
a great deal of currently prohibited conduct should probably be 
decriminalized because the costs of enforcement are too high.  Part III 
examines the relationship between police authority and punishment theory.  
When punishment theory focuses on the state as the agent of punishment, 
rather than looking only at the target of punishment—the criminal—it 
becomes clear that rules of investigative procedure, like the requirements of 
legality or fair trial or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, serve as conditions 
for legitimate punishment.20   
The philosophy of criminal law could, and should, be far more relevant 
to twenty-first century discussions of overcriminalization, mass 
incarceration, police violence, racial bias, and the possibilities for reform.  I 
suspect that the particular implications addressed in this essay are but a 
sample of the new directions criminal law theorists could take, if they would 
be honest about the institutions they are supposedly theorizing.  Criminal law 
is not self-executing.21  It does not operate independently of its enforcers, and 
so the theorist of criminal law must address the agents and practices of law 
enforcement. 
I. THE PROCESS-THEORY DIVIDE 
Whether criminal law theory neglects policing or other aspects of the 
criminal process depends, of course, on what counts as criminal law theory.  
 
assumed rather than argued for the proposition that the proper designation of a person as a 
“criminal,” and the legitimate punishment of that person, are not dependent on a blunder-free 
investigation. 
20  See Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A Counter-Narrative of Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1605–10 (2015); Alice Ristroph, Conditions of 
Legitimate Punishment, in THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 79–95 (Flanders & 
Hoskins eds., 2016). 
21  Criminal law is not self-executing, nor is it self-evident.  In other works, I have 
emphasized the folly of naturalism in criminal law theory—naturalism understood as the claim 
that the substantive prohibitions of criminal law are determined by natural law principles, 
universally shared moral intuitions, or some other extra-legal standard.  See, e.g., Alice 
Ristroph, The Definitive Article, U. TORONTO L.J. 140, 149–54 (2018). 
RISTROPH_PAGE PROOF 4/5/18  8:33 PM 
2018] THIN BLUE LINE FROM CRIME TO PUNISHMENT 311 
The participants in the field have tended to frame their inquiries broadly.22  
Much of the work in this field is philosophical, in that it employs the 
conceptual and analytical approaches of philosophy, but a doctorate in 
philosophy is hardly a requirement.  In a typically inclusive characterization, 
Nicola Lacey defined criminal law theory as “any relatively systematic 
attempt to explicate the social institution of criminal law.”23  The relationship 
between criminal law doctrine and criminal law theory is complex: theorists 
often seek to explain or evaluate existing doctrinal rules, but they usually 
address general principles and broad concepts rather than the minutiae of 
positive law in a given jurisdiction.  The field of criminal law theory includes, 
in Lacey’s elaboration,  
not only work focused on the structure of the criminal law doctrine but also work 
addressed to the broader questions of criminalisation and penality; the actual or proper 
subject matter of criminal law and its classification; the role of the state in drawing on 
its power to criminalise; the justification for state punishment in general or in its 
particular forms.24  
 Notably absent from Lacey’s list (which is unusually and perhaps 
unduly generous in its identification of inquiries into the state as standard fare 
in criminal law theory)25 is the law of criminal enforcement—the procedural 
steps that take an offender from crime to punishment.  According to one 
recent historical study, William Blackstone deliberately and influentially 
separated “procedural technicalities” from the definitions of crimes, labeling 
only the latter as “the criminal law.”26  Theorists have mostly accepted this 
distinction.  The few criminal law theorists to address criminal procedure 
usually begin as I do here: by bemoaning their isolation and regretting 
theorists’ general indifference and inattention to criminal procedure.27 
 
22  See, e.g., Antony Duff, Introduction, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 1 (1998) (describing an inclusive approach to his edited collection 
that did not “worry[] too much about whether the writers or their essays would count as 
‘philosophical’ in a narrow professional sense”).   
23  Nicola Lacey, Contingency, Coherence, and Conceptualism: Reflections on the 
Encounter between ‘Critique’ and ‘the Philosophy of Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
CRIMINAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE, supra note 22, at 19. 
24  Id. at 12. 
25  Lacey is, of course, herself a distinguished and influential criminal law theorist, and her 
work has been unusually attentive to the role of the state and the questions of political theory.  
For example, she has argued that punishment must be theorized “within the context of an 
integrated political philosophy” and “cannot be treated as a discrete, isolated political and 
moral problem.”  NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY 
VALUES xi (1988). 
26  LINDSAY FARMER, MAKING THE MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMINALIZATION AND CIVIL 
ORDER 66 (2016).  
27  See Roberts, supra note 16, at 380. 
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Still, more specification is needed to defend a claim that criminal law 
theory neglects criminal procedure.  We have from Lacey a rough and broad 
account of criminal law theory; we should specify also what counts as 
criminal procedure.  Commentators typically use this term to capture two 
different but related stages of the path from crime to punishment.  First, 
criminal procedure includes investigative procedure—the processes by 
which the police detect crimes, gather evidence, and take suspects into 
custody.28   Second, criminal procedure includes adjudicative procedure—
the legal process through which prosecutors bring and pursue charges and 
courts adjudicate them.29  Both kinds of procedure get less attention from 
criminal law theorists than “substantive” questions of crime definition and 
punishment, but the neglect of investigative procedure is far more 
pronounced.  The trial is, after all, a far older and more established institution 
than the modern police force.  At least since  Jeremy  Bentham and through 
the contemporary work of Antony Duff, adjudicative procedure (especially 
trial procedure) has occasionally gained the philosopher’s attention.30 
Across a number of works, Antony Duff has argued that the criminal 
trial serves important moral and political functions.31  A trial is not 
exclusively or even primarily a quest for truth, at least as truth-seeking is 
ordinarily understood by criminal law scholars.  The trial is instead a forum 
to assess responsibility, and that assessment is a moral inquiry and not strictly 
a question about what facts transpired.  Through adjudicative procedures, the 
community calls a defendant to answer allegations of wrongdoing.  In the 
trial, the defendant should not be a mere bystander, a voiceless object of 
assessment.  Instead, the trial is a forum in which the community can address 
the defendant as a rational and responsible agent and expect him to respond 
as such.  In Duff’s work, the theory of the trial is integrated with the theory 
of punishment: after a trial calls a defendant to answer for wrongdoing and 
the defendant fails to provide a satisfactory defense, punishment calls the 
defendant to account for his actions.32 
One of the distinctive, and welcome, features of Duff’s work is its 
 
28  See Simon, supra note 15, at 146–47. 
29  Id.  
30  See generally II JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Judicial Procedure, with the Outlines 
of a Procedure Code, in WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1–188 (J. Bowring ed., 1837).  
Procedural concerns are also central to theories of restorative justice, but again the focus is 
adjudicative procedure (or alternatives to adjudication) rather than investigative procedure.  
31  See R. A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 99–143 (1986); see generally 3 ANTONY 
DUFF, THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL (2007) 
[hereinafter DUFF, THE TRIAL ON TRIAL]; R. A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY 
AND LIABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008) [hereinafter DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME]. 
32  See generally DUFF, THE TRIAL ON TRIAL, supra note 31. 
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explicit engagement with the state.33  A system of criminal law is a creation 
of a political community. Accordingly, criminal law theory should be 
approached as a branch of political theory.  As a field, political theory is 
hardly indifferent to individuals—many specific political theories view the 
human individuals as temporally and normatively prior to any organized 
political community.  But the field of political theory does not limit its 
inquiries to questions about human individuals.  It is deeply concerned with 
the state, by which I mean the complicated array of public offices and 
institutions that govern a political community.  Criminal law is the product 
of a state, and criminal law theory must concern itself with the state and not 
solely with the individual wrongdoer.  If we understand criminalization and 
punishment as state activities, the important conceptual questions about these 
activities will include a number of questions about the nature and scope of 
police authority. 
Curiously, the state’s role in making and enforcing criminal law may 
have become obscured at the very moment that the state claimed exclusive 
authority for criminal law.  The concept of crime is ancient, but the idea that 
crimes are uniquely public wrongs, to be identified as wrongs by the state 
and punished only by the state, arose only in the late eighteenth century.  In 
an important recent book, Lindsay Farmer identifies Blackstone as the 
founding father of the concept of criminal law who still structures inquiries 
in criminal law theory today.  According to Farmer, Blackstone offered the 
first “concise account of the [criminal] law as a body of rules unified by a 
common aim and conceptual structure.”34  The Commentaries unified a 
diverse array of crimes that had been handled by different courts, separated 
substantive law from criminal procedure, and offered “a new taxonomy of 
crimes, articulated around the unifying concept of the public wrong.”35  This 
last concept is of particular and enduring importance.  It preserved the sense 
of moral violation that characterized much earlier understandings of crimes, 
but it made the state into the violated entity and gave the state (rather than an 
individual victim or his family) the right of reprisal. 
The concept of crime as public wrong was not Blackstone’s only 
influential and enduring contribution.  His Commentaries also described 
criminal law almost wholly in terms of what we now call “substantive” 
 
33  See, e.g., DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME, supra note 31, at 11 (noting that normative 
legal theory “depends on political theory—on an underlying normative conception of the state 
and its proper relationship to its inhabitants,” and setting forth the basic conception of the state 
that informs his own argument). 
34  FARMER, supra note 26, at 66.  
35  Id. 
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conduct rules, distinguishing them from “procedural technicalities.”36  
Substantive criminal prohibitions are widely applicable, and most often 
applied to private individuals, while the rules of criminal procedure most 
directly constrain state officials.  Thus, a substance/procedure dichotomy, 
especially one that becomes a hierarchy with substance treated as more 
important, likely reinforces the view that private actors’ conduct should be 
the primary object of scrutiny in criminal law theory.  
The mere observation that the substance/procedure dichotomy is 
historically contingent is a valuable antidote to a tendency of philosophers to 
treat criminal law as relatively stable across place and time.  Theories of 
adjudicative procedure, including Duff’s work on criminal trials, are not quite 
ahistorical, but neither are they enmeshed in historical—or jurisdictional—
specificity.  Judges, courtrooms, and trials are ancient and venerable 
institutions, as noted above.  Their contemporary incarnations share 
important dimensions with the courts that drew Bentham’s attention in the 
nineteenth century.  Indeed, Duff’s account of the political functions of a trial 
could be applied to the trial of Socrates in Athens in 399 B.C.  Was Socrates 
not called to answer for his alleged offenses (corrupting the youth), and 
punished only after his answer, or apology, was deemed insufficient?37  The 
theorist who tackles trial procedure is thus not bound by the empirical details 
of a particular time and place.  He can appeal to concepts as broad, as 
familiar, and as potentially universal as the concepts of crime and punishment 
themselves.  Of course, as Duff acknowledges, criminal trials are fading from 
use in the twenty-first century; this reality is particularly stark in the United 
States.38  There is thus some irony in the recent philosophical attention to the 
criminal trial, but perhaps we should expect by now that the owl of Minerva 
will fly only at dusk.39 
 
36  “Procedural technicalities” is a modern phrase, used by Farmer to describe Blackstone’s 
efforts.  See id.  But several commentators trace the substance/procedure distinction to 
Blackstone or his student Jeremy Bentham.  See, e.g., Thomas O. Main, The Procedural 
Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 804–06 (2010); D. Michael 
Risinger, “Substance” and “Procedure” Revisited with Some Afterthoughts on the 
Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable Presumptions,” 30 UCLA L. REV. 189, 191–92 
(1982). 
37  See generally I.F. STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES (1988). 
38  See Antony Duff, A Criminal Law We Can Call Our Own?, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1491, 
1498 (2017); Gregory M. Gilchrist, Trial Bargaining, 101 IOWA L. REV. 609, 611–12 (2016) 
(discussing rarity of criminal trials and the prevalence of plea bargaining).   
39  The German philosopher Hegel famously doubted that humans could ever gain 
philosophical understanding of their own practices in time to reform them: 
A further word on the subject of issuing instructions on how the world ought to be: 
philosophy, at any rate, always comes too late to perform this function . . . . When 
RISTROPH_PAGE PROOF 4/5/18  8:33 PM 
2018] THIN BLUE LINE FROM CRIME TO PUNISHMENT 315 
There is thus some attention in criminal law theory to adjudicative 
procedures, though this attention is primarily focused on trials rather than the 
specific procedure that resolves most actual cases today—plea bargaining.40  
There is almost no attention given to investigative procedure, and one 
possible explanation is that investigative procedure is not a topic well suited 
to the field’s cross-jurisdictional, ahistorical aspirations.  In comparison to 
courts and trials, police forces are relatively recent developments, and the 
specific rules governing police activity can vary considerably from one 
modern legal system to the next.41  In the United States, investigative 
procedure is largely, though not exclusively, a matter of federal constitutional 
law.  Judicial interpretations of a few specific constitutional provisions 
generate minimum standards for police officers.  And this field of law is itself 
of relatively recent vintage, with many key principles or concepts originating 
in judicial opinions decided in the last half-century.  Thus, theorizing 
American investigative procedure might be viewed as a project in American 
constitutional theory—a worthy undertaking, maybe, but one very different 
from the work of criminal law theorists.42 
 
philosophy paints its grey in grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be 
rejuvenated, but only recognized . . . the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the 
onset of dusk. 
G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 23 (Nisbet & Wood trans., 1991). 
40  For a thoughtful theoretical analysis of plea bargaining, albeit one probably too focused 
on empirical psychological research to be counted as a work in the philosophy of criminal law, 
see Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 409–
11 (2008).  Recent work by Joshua Kleinfeld gestures at a philosophical critique of plea 
bargaining, one that may elaborate the already familiar complaints that plea bargaining gives 
prosecutors too much power and juries⎯as representatives of the community⎯too little.  See 
Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Justice, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1455, 1484–85 
(2017). 
41  See, e.g., CLIVE EMSLEY, THE GREAT BRITISH BOBBY: A HISTORY OF BRITISH POLICING 
FROM THE 18TH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 26–27 (2010); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME 
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27–28, 69 (1993).  Although specific rules of 
procedure vary by jurisdiction, it is possible to generalize and identify a number of common 
principles.  Forty years ago, Mirjan Damaska distinguished between a hierarchical model of 
authority and a coordinate model, associating the former with criminal procedure in 
continental Europe and the latter with Anglo-American criminal procedure.  See Mirjan 
Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 
481–82 (1975).  A somewhat more recent comparative study contrasts U.S. law to that of 
England, France, and Germany.  See Christopher Slobogin, An Empirically Based 
Comparison of American and European Regulatory Approaches to Police Investigation, 22 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 423, 424 (2001). 
42  In actuality, the provisions of the United States Constitution that govern both 
investigative and adjudicative procedure have been mostly neglected by soi-disant 
constitutional theorists, so that “constitutional law” is one field and “criminal procedure” is 
another, with relatively little overlap between the two.  For a discussion of this gap, see Louis 
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It remains unclear how much we should indulge or perpetuate the 
ahistorical, cross-jurisdictional aims of criminal law theory.43  But even if 
there exist core concepts of crime and punishment that transcend time and 
place, the implementation of these concepts in the contemporary world is 
intrinsically bound up with particular types of state actions, including not 
only adjudication but also the activity of policing.  And even if the precise 
regulations for police vary by country, certain core questions about police 
functions recur across many jurisdictions.  Thus, the criminal law theorist has 
work to do on these topics.  Across industrialized democracies, police 
investigate crimes and apprehend suspects.  To accomplish these goals, they 
may have varying degrees of authority to search homes, to ask questions, to 
eavesdrop, to use deception, or to use force.  How much authority they should 
have is, I suggest, a central question that criminal law theory should tackle.  
It is a question that deserves attention in its own right, insofar as criminal law 
theory is a branch of political theory and an examination of the nature and 
limits of political power.44  But the scope of police authority is also an 
important dimension of two issues that already occupy much of the field of 
criminal law theory: criminalization and punishment.  I shall say more about 
the ways in which policing bears upon each of these subjects in the next two 
Parts.  Before taking up those questions, however, I briefly consider a missed 
opportunity in twentieth-century criminal law theory. 
One notable work addressed criminalization, punishment, and 
investigative procedure all in one package, but its connections between 
procedure and other issues in criminal law theory have been overlooked by 
most readers.  Herbert Packer’s 1968 book, The Limits of the Criminal 
Sanction, was an early complaint about “overcriminalization,” before that 
specific term was widely used.45  Packer argued that society resorted to 
 
D. Bilionis, Conservative Reformation, Popularization, and the Lessons of Reading Criminal 
Justice as Constitutional Law, 52 UCLA L. REV. 979, 986–89 (2005).  For an intriguing 
attempt to bridge it, see Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth 
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 103–12 (1988). 
43  See Nicola Lacey, Philosophy, History, and Criminal Law Theory, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 295, 308–09 (1998) (questioning “the autonomy of philosophy” and arguing for a 
“contextual method” in which “criminal law theory [is] a task of social theory of which 
historical method is a central part”). 
44  Although Mirjan Damaska’s seminal work on comparative criminal procedure has not 
been embraced within the criminal theory canon, perhaps it should be.  From a standpoint 
more sociological than philosophical, Damaska sought to show the ways in which different 
procedural approaches reflected differences in political culture.  See Damaska, supra note 41, 
at 481 (“[D]ivergences in procedural arrangements are, to a considerable extent, related to 
larger divergences in the conception of the proper organization of authority characteristic of 
the Continent and the English-speaking world.”). 
45  HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).  
RISTROPH_PAGE PROOF 4/5/18  8:33 PM 
2018] THIN BLUE LINE FROM CRIME TO PUNISHMENT 317 
criminal prohibitions far too often, even as he sought to defend the basic 
legitimacy of criminal law from philosophical critique.46  Packer was not a 
philosopher, though he read and relied upon thinkers such as Bentham and 
Mill, and his book is addressed to “the Common Reader” as an argument 
about sound criminal justice policy.47  But I don’t think there can be any 
doubt that Packer’s own work counts as criminal law theory.  This is clearest, 
perhaps, in the first of the three parts of the book, which offered a theory of 
punishment and basic principles of criminalization.  The second part of the 
book contrasted two models of the criminal process, not as a comparative 
study of different jurisdictions but as an effort to elaborate two normative 
visions competing within American law.48  Importantly, the third and final 
part applied the “constraints of rationale and process” described earlier in the 
book and argued for specific limitations on the substantive criminal law.49  
That is, Packer used both the traditional fodder of criminal law theory and an 
analysis of criminal procedure to develop his account of what should properly 
be criminal. 
Unfortunately for the history of criminal law scholarship, the reflections 
on investigative and adjudicative procedure in the middle part of Packer’s 
book had been published previously as an independent article, divorced from 
his inquiries into principles of criminalization and limitations on 
punishment.50  And that is how his ideas have been received and understood: 
he is recognized for a groundbreaking effort to identify the values underlying 
various rules of criminal procedure, and a separate, unrelated (and 
unremarkable) effort to articulate a theory of criminalization and a theory of 
 
46  Id. at 364. 
47  See id. at 4.  
48  Packer surveyed both investigative and judicial procedure and distinguished between a 
Crime Control model, in which criminal procedures should be designed to remove innocent 
suspects from the process as quickly as possible and ferry all others to conviction and 
punishment as quickly as possible, and a Due Process model, in which criminal procedures 
should limit state power and establish repeated opportunities for judicial determination of both 
legal and factual guilt.  See id. at 154–73. 
49  Id. at 4. 
50  See generally Herbert Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 
1 (1964). 
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punishment.51  The third part of his book has dropped from view altogether.52  
Perhaps The Limits of the Criminal Sanction does not make explicit enough 
the connection between its middle chapters and the more familiar 
philosophical inquiries that begin and end the book.  Perhaps if Packer had 
lived a bit longer after the book’s publication, he might have forced more 
attention to policing in the philosophy of criminal law.53  Instead, his legacy 
is a deeply influential account of criminal procedure—one that nearly 
dominates theoretical reflections on investigative procedure, but not one that 
links investigative procedure to the usual inquiries of criminal law theory.54 
Again, those usual inquiries concern the substantive criminal law, and 
thus to some extent the theory/process divide is just a manifestation of the 
substance/procedure divide.  But on this point we should note that outside the 
 
51  Packer’s models of criminal procedure are cited far more often than his theories of 
punishment or criminalization.  A contemporaneous book review labeled The Limits of the 
Criminal Sanction “very disappointing” and “soporific”—but excepted the “very important” 
central third of the book, the section on criminal procedure.  John Griffiths, The Limits of 
Criminal Law Scholarship, 79 YALE L.J. 1388, 1388 (1970).  A recent essay on Packer’s book, 
honoring the 40th anniversary of its publication, focuses exclusively on the models of the 
criminal process.  Hadar Aviram, Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due 
Process Model, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 237 (2011).  In contrast, Packer’s “mixed” theory of 
punishment, combining deterrence and retributive concerns, is seen as a mere reprise of 
arguments first developed by John Rawls.  See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence 
of Death, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1050 (1978).  Packer’s criminalization theory is seen as a 
straightforward consequentialist argument that does not fully defend its premises.  See, e.g., 
HUSAK , supra note 11, at 59.  None of these commentators address Packer’s claim that the 
costs of enforcement must factor into the choice to use the criminal sanction. 
52  Packer’s substantive arguments are addressed in further detail in Part II below, but I 
note here that he began the last part of the book with a conjecture that may seem foolish in 
retrospect.  Packer noted that the expansions of defendants’ procedural rights made the use of 
the criminal sanction more costly and surmised that these costs could lead legislators to be 
more circumspect in their choices to criminalize.  PACKER, supra note 45, at 245–46.  In fact, 
the conventional wisdom now is that legislators took precisely the opposite tack, expanding 
the substantive criminal law to make enforcement easier even in the face of defendants’ 
procedural rights.  See generally William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between 
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997). 
53  Packer suffered a massive stroke in 1969, the year after The Limits of the Criminal 
Sanction was published, and never fully recovered.  He died in 1972.  See Herbert Packer is 
Dead at 47; Stanford Law Professor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1972, at 48. 
54  I should note that Packer’s models drew critics from the start and that some 
commentators see his considerable influence on criminal procedure scholarship as a detriment 
of the field.  See, e.g., John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or a Third “Model” of 
the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970); Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, 
and the Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 532 (1992) (“[P]erhaps 
nothing has dampened the spirit of criminal procedure scholarship more than the early 
unfortunate success of Herbert Packer’s famous two models—crime control and due process.  
People have been searching for something else imaginative to say ever since.”). 
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world of criminal law theory, among those who study doctrine and policy, 
there is frequent emphasis on the interactions between substantive criminal 
law and the rules of criminal procedure.  This emphasis is a core theme of 
William Stuntz’s influential work.  Stuntz advanced a well-known argument 
that the Warren Court’s efforts to restrict police authority had backfired by 
prompting legislatures to enact ever broader criminal codes and thus expand 
police discretion.55  Slightly less famously, he also suggested that earlier, pre-
Warren Court interpretations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were 
motivated by concerns about the excessive reach of substantive criminal 
law.56  Stuntz’s work was historical, explaining doctrinal developments rather 
than organizing concepts, and it was specific to the United States.  It drew 
upon public choice theory and that field’s insights into the incentives and 
interactions among various political actors, but it did not claim to be criminal 
law theory and has not been received as such.  Stuntz’s last work, like 
Packer’s The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, seeks to convince a broad 
audience of the ills of current American criminal justice policy, linking the 
substantive criminal law with the law of criminal procedure.57  My suggestion 
here is simply that the insight that drove so much of Stuntz’s writing and 
influenced so many of his colleagues—that the substantive and procedural 
dimensions of criminal law should be studied in relation to one another—is 
an insight that should, at long last, reach the criminal law theorists.58  Parts II 
and III address some of the questions that this insight might provoke. 
II. CRIMINALIZATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
What is a crime?  What is the best conceptual account of bribery, or 
rape, or theft?  What should be treated as criminal?  These questions motivate 
much of criminal law theory.  Scholars may offer general principles to guide 
all criminal legislation, or they may offer negative constraints to tell us when 
not to use criminal sanctions, or they may begin with particular offenses and 
 
55  See, e.g., WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 216, 265 
(2011). 
56  See generally William Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 
YALE L.J. 393 (1995). 
57  See generally STUNTZ, supra note 55. 
58  See generally THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF 
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ (Skeel & Steiker eds., 2014) (detailing Stuntz’s influence, including his 
effort to reconnect criminal procedure and substantive criminal law).  I cannot develop the 
point fully here, but I note that Stuntz urged scholars to focus on the interaction of procedure 
and substance without questioning seriously the coherence of the dichotomy and without 
questioning the hierarchy in which “substantive” guilt takes precedence over procedural 
“technicalities.”  Thinkers inclined to theorize procedure might begin by reexamining the very 
substance/procedure dichotomy and the perception that substance is more important. 
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analyze the reasons for their criminalization.59  For decades now, scholars 
have been especially troubled by expanding criminal codes and expanding 
prison populations so that modern theories of criminalization are largely 
efforts to address the problem of overcriminalization.60  Scholars have 
suggested that we should decriminalize all conduct other than true “public 
wrongs,” for example, or that we resuscitate a harm principle that limits the 
substantive criminal law to conduct harmful to others.61  In this section, I 
develop the idea that we cannot decide whether to use the criminal sanction 
without contemplating enforcement considerations.  When we decide to 
address a perceived social ill with a criminal law, we empower public actors 
in important ways.  We empower the state to punish, as many theorists have 
recognized, but we also empower it to police: to monitor, to detain, to search, 
and to arrest.  For many existing offenses, the strongest argument against 
criminalization is not the punishments these offenses carry, but the police 
authority they produce. 
Broadly speaking, theories of criminalization address the question of 
what should be made criminal.  The very form of the word—criminalize, as 
a verb—should draw our attention to the fact of human agency: acts are made 
criminal, rather than always already being so.62  Notwithstanding this 
opportunity to focus on the human construction of criminal law, most theories 
of criminalization identify an extra-legal standard to which human legislators 
should conform the criminal law.  Some scholars adapt Blackstone’s concept 
of a “public wrong”; others give more attention to harm.63  Lest these 
 
59  Packer undertook the first two projects, though he focused on the second.  See infra 
Part I.  Doug Husak’s noted recent book similarly focuses on the limits of the criminal law.  
See HUSAK, supra note 11, at 3 (“[T]he most pressing problem with the criminal law today is 
that we have too much of it.”).  Gideon Yaffe’s study of attempts exemplifies the third 
approach.  See generally GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE 
CRIMINAL LAW (2010). 
60  See generally ANTONY DUFF ET AL., THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2010); 
JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1984); see also HUSAK, supra 
note 11, at 120 (“[A] theory of criminalization is needed to provide a principled basis to reverse 
the tendency [toward] more and more punishment.”); PACKER, supra note 45, at 364 (“[W]e 
resort to [criminal law] in far too indiscriminate a way . . . .”). 
61  See, e.g., Janine Young Kim, Rule and Exception in Criminal Law (Or, Are Criminal 
Defenses Necessary?), 82 TUL. L. REV. 247, 274–75 (2007) (noting the emphasis on public 
wrong in academic criminal law theory, and arguing that a different emphasis on harm 
prevention actually drives criminal justice policy). 
62  Acts, not people, are the usual objects of the verb under the modern definition of 
“criminalize,” but as Lindsay Farmer notes of an earlier understanding, to criminalize is “to 
turn a person into a criminal.”  FARMER, supra note 26, at 4–5.  The modern usage may obscure 
the extent to which criminal law does still turn persons into criminals.  See Ristroph, supra 
note 21, at 162–64. 
63  See generally JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO 
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approaches be confused, much ink is spilled to explain the difference between 
wrongs and harms.64  Notably, these various efforts all identify what is to be 
criminal by identifying conduct or consequences that the theorist would wish 
out of existence.  But the criminal law does not work like that.  It is certainly 
not a perfect deterrent, and as noted earlier, it is not self-executing.  The 
criminal law identifies conduct as eligible for punishment, and it authorizes 
(but rarely requires) law enforcement to investigate allegations of said 
conduct, to gather evidence of it, and to arrest persons suspected of engaging 
in the prohibited conduct.  So when we pass a new statute, we should not 
pretend that we are waving a magic wand that will make the defined conduct 
disappear.65  We are instead empowering an enforcement mechanism, and the 
choice to criminalize should weigh both the expected benefits and the 
expected costs of enforcement. 
Hints of the argument I am making here have arisen in earlier 
scholarship, but without much impact.  Herbert Packer made suggestions 
along these lines in The Limits of the Criminal Sanction—but not in the 
section drawn from his “Two Models” article, so these suggestions have 
received little attention.  In Chapter Fifteen, somewhat misleadingly titled 
“The Search for Limits: Profit and Loss,” Packer identified a number of ways 
in which the realities of criminal enforcement generated normative 
constraints on the substantive criminal law.66  The chapter’s title is somewhat 
deceptive because while some of Packer’s concerns are simple 
consequentialist, cost-benefit arguments, others appeal to near-categorical 
claims about individual rights and the limits of state power.  In 
consequentialist terms, Packer argued that remote or trivial harms should not 
be addressed by the criminal law, for the costs of enforcement are not worth 
the gain.67  But he also criticized the use of criminal sanctions to perform 
“covert functions,” such as official harassment of persons who, in the state’s 
assessment, are not quite worth the effort of formal prosecution.68  The 
criminalization of minor offenses often serves simply to license police 
 
OTHERS (1984); Tatjana Hornle, Theories of Criminalization, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 301 (2016) 
(reviewing A.P. SIMESTER & ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CRIMES, HARMS AND WRONGS: ON THE 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINALISATION (2011)); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW (1997). 
64  See generally SIMESTER & VON HIRSCH, supra note 63; Jean Hampton, Correcting 
Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659 (1992). 
65  See Husak, supra note 18, at 469 (describing “the common mistake that the criminal 
law operates by preventing certain forms of conduct” and cautioning against the pretense that 
the state has “a magic wand” to make proscribed conduct disappear). 
66  PACKER, supra note 45, at 270–95. 
67  Id. at 270–77. 
68  Id. at 293. 
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officers to hassle bothersome persons until they go away (or stop being 
bothersome).  Such harassment, Packer claimed, “is objectionable because it 
constitutes in effect punishment without determination of guilt.”69 
A few glimpses, but only glimpses, of similar concerns with 
enforcement appear in Doug Husak’s otherwise powerful argument for limits 
on the substantive criminal law.  Husak identifies four constraints “internal” 
to the criminal law and three additional “external” constraints.70  Internal 
constraints come “from within criminal theory itself: from the general part of 
the criminal law, and from reflection about the nature and justification of 
punishment.”71  Specific internal constraints include the principles that 
criminal offenses must be designed to address a nontrivial harm or evil; that 
they must address wrongful conduct; that they must impose only deserved 
punishment; and finally, that those who wish to criminalize conduct bear the 
burden of proof of showing that the other constraints are satisfied.72  What 
Husak calls “external” constraints on the criminal law are those derived from 
political theory rather than the criminal law itself.  They specify conditions 
that must be satisfied in order to overcome the important right not to be 
punished.73  Taking inspiration from so-called “intermediate scrutiny” in 
American constitutional law, Husak enumerates three requirements of 
criminal legislation: it must serve a substantial state interest; it must directly 
advance that interest; and it must do so by means no more extensive than 
necessary.74  Tellingly, Husak notes that internal constraints on the criminal 
law are addressed primarily to those who are punished, while external 
constraints are addressed to all members of a political community.75  Not 
much turns on the classification of criminalization principles as internal or 
external, but Husak’s labels illustrate the view that considerations of political 
theory are external to the field of criminal law theory.  In any event, Husak 
is surely right to look for an account of the appropriate scope of the criminal 
law that considers and addresses the entire political community. 
If we are to view criminal law as a form of state action that should be 
justifiable to the whole community, then we must consider the social and 
 
69  Id. 
70  HUSAK, supra note 11, at 55. 
71  Id. at 103. 
72  See id. at 66, 82, 100 (respectively discussing nontrivial harm and wrongfulness 
constraints, desert constraint, and burden of proof constraint).  
73  Id. at 120.  As I suggest in this essay, there is no reason to think of conditions of 
legitimate punishment as “external” to criminal law or criminal law theory, but not much turns 
on the labels internal/external in Husak’s theory. 
74  HUSAK, supra note 11, at 132. 
75  Id. at 120–21.   
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political costs that ensue when we choose criminalization over other 
measures (or over doing nothing).76  It is important to clarify the term “costs” 
here.  The criminal law is expensive, but its costs are not simply monetary.  
Many of the most relevant costs are intangible harms77 to individual and 
social interests: loss of liberty or dignity; separations of families; and 
opportunity costs for the larger community.  Some of these costs may be 
incurred as soon as a statute is passed (a statute criminalizing sodomy inflicts 
an expressive harm by its very existence, for example), but most of the costs 
of the criminal law are the costs of enforcement: the costs of policing, 
adjudication, and punishment.  Though Husak favors the language of justice 
over that of costs,78 a concern with the costs (or shall we say the burdens) of 
the criminal law, especially the costs of punishment, seems to motivate much 
of his argument.79  Occasionally and all too briefly, he alludes to the costs of 
policing as well.80 
The worry about the price of enforcement is illustrated well by Husak’s 
discussion of the burden of proof constraint—the requirement that those who 
favor criminal legislation bear the burden of proof of defending it.  This 
constraint may be understood as a default assumption that criminal law is 
harmful (or costly, in my loose usage).  In elaborating the harms of the 
criminal law, Husak emphasizes punishment.  He imagines a proposed 
criminal prohibition of doughnut consumption, motivated by a state interest 
in reducing obesity.81  To justify such a law, Husak argues, it is not enough 
to say that the law will actually reduce obesity and persons have no right to 
 
76  See generally Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 323 (2004).  One need not endorse the particular “regulatory impact assessment 
procedure” recommended by Brown to appreciate his broader claim that criminal justice 
policy choices should take into account the various tangible and intangible costs of criminal 
law.  See id. at 335; see also PACKER, supra note 45, at 270–71. 
77  The word “harm” is somewhat problematic, too, given that criminal law theorists 
distinguish among many kinds of negative conditions: harms, wrongs, injustices, and so forth.  
I use “harm” in a non-technical sense that would encompass all those negative conditions. 
78  Husak seems to limit the term costs to financial considerations.  See HUSAK, supra note 
11, at 7–8.  But “costs” seems to me the best word to capture all of the negative consequences 
that flow from adopting a criminal sanction: burdens, harms, injustices, lost opportunities, and 
also dollars spent. 
79  Stuart Green notes that the cost inquiry “finds its way only partially, and then not 
explicitly, into [Husak’s] theory.”  Stuart P. Green, Is There Too Much Criminal Law?, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 737, 744 (2009).  It is true that Husak does not explicitly frame his constraints 
as inquiries into costs, and indeed he would probably resist my terminology as too close to the 
language of utilitarianism and economic theory.  Still, I think it is fair to characterize Husak’s 
powerful book as an argument that whatever we gain from our criminal law, it is not worth the 
tremendous tolls—financial and intangible—we currently pay.  
80  See, e.g., HUSAK, supra note 11, at 13. 
81  Id. at 101–02. 
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eat doughnuts.82  We must also consider the general right not to be punished; 
it is not clear that reducing obesity can justify the infringement of that right.83  
In other words, we ask not only whether the conduct in question is conduct 
we wish to eliminate, but also whether a criminal prohibition is worth the 
costs of enforcement. 
All of this is reasonable enough, but it should be noted that punishment 
is not the only burden imposed by the criminal law—it is not the only thing 
the defender of a criminal statute should have to justify.  With each new 
offense, we have to get from crime to punishment; we have to detect the 
doughnut-eaters, arrest them, and prosecute them.  And just as persons have 
interests in not being punished, they have interests in not being surveilled, 
arrested, detained, and tried.84  Part of the problem with the doughnut ban is 
the authority it gives to police officers and prosecutors.  This authority is 
problematic in at least two respects: when the authority to arrest (or 
prosecute) is actually exercised, it imposes burdens on the individual and 
society; and even when the authority is not exercised, the possession of broad 
authority gives police and prosecutors discretion that might be troubling in 
itself. 
Husak is, of course, cognizant of these concerns.  But he addresses 
police power and the investigative process only briefly, giving far more 
attention to punishment than to other enforcement considerations.85  Happily, 
though, nothing in his theory of criminalization forecloses inquiries into 
investigative procedure.  In the remainder of this section, I elaborate a few 
more ways in which questions about police authority intersect with questions 
about the scope and content of substantive criminal law.  This discussion 
provides, I hope, a sketch for further research—I identify more questions here 
than I offer answers. 
Most broadly, policing is quite often intrusive, so to enact a criminal 
statute is to authorize intrusion.  Importantly, the intrusions of policing are 
not usually subject to the ex ante adjudicative constraints that apply to 
punishment.  The warrant “requirement” notwithstanding, most police action 
does not require prior judicial approval.  Acting on her own judgment alone, 
an officer may watch a person, or stop him, or ask him questions, or detain 
 
82  Id. at 102.  
83  Id.  
84  The burdens of adjudicative procedures are detailed in MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE 
PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979). 
85  See HUSAK, supra note 11, at 13 (“[T]he growth in the scope of the criminal law is 
worrisome even when it does not culminate in conviction and punishment . . .  Arrest shares 
with punishment many of the features that make the latter so difficult to justify.”); id. at 21–
22 (discussing how police and prosecutorial discretion generates excessive punishment). 
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him briefly or not so briefly, or even take him into custody.  All of these 
familiar components of policing are intrusive, and it is not surprising that 
those who receive police attention will often resist it.  Of course, resistance 
typically triggers even greater police authority.  A suspect who flees an 
officer becomes even more suspicious, and with greater suspicion police may 
take more intrusive measures to stop the suspect.  A suspect who actually 
resists arrest becomes a legitimate target of police force—even deadly force, 
and even if the offense of arrest was as minor as selling loose cigarettes, 
jaywalking, or eating doughnuts.86 
Here, I should note that the law of criminal procedure is largely 
transsubstantive, meaning that the same procedural rules apply no matter 
what underlying substantive offense is being investigated.87  Several recent 
deaths of unarmed black men at the hands of police officers illustrate the 
consequences of transsubstantive procedural rules—and also the ease with 
which police responses to minor offenses can escalate to deadly force.88  
Transsubstantivity has been criticized from two perspectives: from those who 
argue that restrictions on police should be relaxed when terrorism or other 
serious crimes are at stake and from those who argue that restrictions on the 
police should be heightened for the investigation of minor offenses.89  
Perhaps the principle of transsubstantivity should be abandoned or modified.  
Perhaps instead we should simply decriminalize many minor offenses.  But 
our current regime, which criminalizes a vast range of conduct and preserves 
the principle of broad and transsubstantive procedural power, may be the 
worst of all worlds.  In any case, normative theories of criminalization should 
take account of the fact of transsubstantive procedure.  
Even beyond the principle of transsubstantivity, some (or most) of the 
rules of investigative procedure might just be bad rules.  To recognize but 
avoid this problem, theorists of the substantive criminal law could simply 
stipulate a just investigative (and adjudicative) process.  Theorists of 
punishment sometimes adopt this strategy, stipulating humane and just prison 
conditions before articulating a defense of punishment.  Leaving aside the 
circularity in such arguments, here my key point is that we cannot stipulate 
 
86  See Ristroph, supra note 3, at 1191–1212. 
87  See William Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2140 (2002). 
88  Briefly, the observation of any offense, no matter how minor, yields the power to make 
an arrest, which includes the power to use force if necessary to effect the arrest.  Ristroph, 
supra note 3, at 1203–07. 
89  See, e.g., Sherry Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment 
“Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1645 (1998) (arguing for more restrictive Fourth 
Amendment rules for investigations of minor offenses); Stuntz, supra note 87, at 2162 
(arguing for “a kind of regulatory swap” in which police have greater authority for some types 
of investigation and more restricted authority for others). 
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the intrusions out of policing altogether, just as we cannot stipulate the harms 
out of punishment altogether.  Even under the ideal rules of investigative 
procedure, we can expect intrusions by the police.  Police intrusions cannot 
be limited to the actually guilty.  Even under ideal conditions, they will 
sometimes be imposed on the merely suspicious but actually innocent.  A 
theorist concerned to justify actual criminal laws must address the inevitable 
enforcement costs.  Some costs will be incurred whatever the rules of 
investigative procedure, and current costs are particularly high given our 
existing rules of investigative procedure. 
Again, to enact a criminal statute is to authorize intrusion—but only to 
authorize it, in most cases.  That is, a criminal statute does not create a 
binding enforcement obligation on police officers (or prosecutors).  Instead, 
it creates a space for discretion, and a theory of criminalization must 
contemplate police and prosecutorial discretion.  Some theorists contrast law 
with discretion, a dichotomy itself possible only if we do not count 
enforcement measures as part of the law itself.  For example, Markus Dubber 
has sought to highlight an older understanding of the term “police”—not the 
law enforcement agents we know today, but police as in “the police power,” 
a broad power “to govern men and things” in pursuit of aims as broad as 
peace, decency, tranquility—or civil order.  Though we no longer speak of 
this general power to govern in terms of “police”—legislative prerogative 
might be a more modern term—the underlying principle of all-purpose 
regulatory power continues to influence criminalization choices. As 
legislatures enact broad and ill-defined prohibitions, law enforcement 
officials gain greater leeway to pick and choose among possible defendants. 
Dubber sees this enduring influence of “police power” as the 
contamination by law of discretion.90  But philosophers should reassess the 
supposed distinction between law and discretion in the context of criminal 
law.  The direct (and probably intended) effect of most substantive criminal 
laws is the authorization of official discretion.  This effect is far more likely, 
and easier to verify, than deterrent effects, a morally just distribution of 
punishment, or any of the other usual promised payoffs of criminal law.  A 
statute criminalizing cocaine possession does not guarantee that no one will 
possess cocaine; it may or may not decrease instances of possession.  The 
statute will authorize punishment of a person who possesses cocaine, but it 
 
90  See generally MARKUS DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2005).  Farmer explains that Blackstone did not 
really know what to do with the police power, treating it as “a residual category which 
includes . . . crimes that do not seem to fit within other categories of public justice: bigamy, 
Egyptians, common nuisances, idle and incorrigible rogues . . . .”  FARMER, supra note 26, at 
73. 
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certainly does not guarantee it.  What the statute does is simply to empower 
police and prosecutors.  Police now have the power to investigate and arrest 
those they suspect of possessing cocaine; prosecutors have the power to file 
charges and pursue convictions on the basis of the statutorily defined 
conduct.  Neither police nor prosecutors are legally bound to catch every 
cocaine possessor.  And when a police officer declines to make an arrest 
(though a statute would authorize one) or a prosecutor declines to pursue 
conviction, we do not typically label such decisions “nullifications” of the 
law as we do sometimes speak of juries nullifying law.91  We do not speak of 
police nullification or prosecutorial nullification because police and 
prosecutorial discretion are just part of the law. 
With discretion, of course, comes the potential for discrimination.  It is 
all too well established that police and prosecutorial discretion yield patterns 
of racially disparate treatment, in which minorities are more likely to receive 
the greatest investigative scrutiny, the most serious charges, and the heaviest 
penalties.92  Criminal law theorists are hardly indifferent to the well-
documented racial disparities in the criminal justice system, but nor are they 
presently equipped to say much about these disparities.  Racial biases are 
very rarely visible on the face of criminal statutes.  They operate through the 
processes of enforcement—processes beyond the present scope of criminal 
law theory. 
A few other implications of theorizing enforcement are worth noting.  
First, some observers might view the measures necessary to enforce some 
types of criminal laws as categorically unacceptable.  Think especially of the 
criminal regulation of sexual conduct.  Decades ago, the criminal prohibition 
of the use of contraception was seen as problematic, in part because it invited 
police into the bedroom.93  Similarly, some of the strongest objections to 
sodomy laws focused not on the penalties imposed to enforce such laws, but 
on the investigative measures they authorized.94  Second, and relatedly, 
 
91  But see Roger Fairfax, Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243 (2011) 
(claiming to coin the term “prosecutorial nullification,” but giving it a meaning narrower than 
my usage here). 
92  See generally Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The 
Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202 (2007); L. Song Richardson, Arrest 
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035 (2011). 
93  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (“Would we allow the police to 
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?  
The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marital relationship.”).  
94  For an illuminating discussion of the enforcement concerns that surrounded Griswold 
and other efforts to limit criminal regulation of sexual conduct, see Melissa Murray, 
Griswold’s Criminal Law, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1045, 1061–63 (2015).  To be sure, enforcement 
concerns are hardly the only objection at stake; sodomy bans might be said to inflict an 
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enforcement considerations are often relevant to the drafting of criminal 
statutes.  Put differently, we should think about policing not just when we 
decide what should be criminal, but also when we decide how to address a 
given problem through the criminal law.  To borrow again from Herbert 
Packer, consider a New York City law that prohibits smoking in bed in a 
hotel.95  That provision, Packer argued, could not be enforced without 
unacceptably intrusive surveillance and invasions of privacy.  
“Alternatively,” suggested Packer, “the solution might have been to make it 
criminal to cause a fire by smoking in bed, regardless of the amount of harm 
done.  That kind of prohibition would at least have been enforceable, whether 
or not it was enforced.”96 
Finally, enforcement practices are relevant to the scope and definitions 
of affirmative defenses—most obviously, to claims of entrapment.  A claim 
of entrapment may be a claim about the defendant’s responsibility, but it is 
equally or more a direct complaint about the propriety of the state’s 
investigative procedures.  And if criminal law theory is indifferent to 
investigative procedure, it should not surprise us that entrapment is not often 
scrutinized by criminal law theorists.97  In the United States, even 
doctrinalists or others working outside the parameters of philosophical 
inquiry tend to neglect entrapment: the entrapment defense is so narrowly 
defined by courts and so rarely successful for defendants that it has all but 
disappeared from scholarly discourse.98  But consider entrapment in a non-
technical sense—the layman’s worry about the deliberate facilitation of 
offenses by police.  As an investigative practice, the facilitation of crime is 
very common indeed. 99  Whatever the contours of positive law, normative 
criminal law theory should address the implications of such investigative 
practices on a defendant’s liability for punishment.100  To do so, philosophical 
 
expressive harm even if violations are never investigated and never prosecuted.  But the 
enforcement powers generated by such bans was a significant part of the objection to them.   
95  PACKER, supra note 45, at 271. 
96  Id. at 272. 
97  But see Andrew Ashworth, Testing Fidelity to Legal Values: Official Involvement and 
Criminal Justice, in  CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 310–22 
(Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002) (discussing entrapment); id. at 300 (noting that 
entrapment is a topic outside of “the mainstream”). 
98  See T. Ward Frampton, Predisposition and Positivism: The Forgotten Foundations of 
the Entrapment Doctrine, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 111–14 (2013) (discussing 
counterterrorism sting operations in which suspects were invited to join highly improbable 
plots, then arrested, and noting the consistent failure of entrapment claims). 
99  See generally Murphy, supra note 5. 
100  For a relatively recent study of these issues by a criminal law theorist, see Gideon 
Yaffe, “The Government Beguiled Me”: The Entrapment Defense and the Problem of Private 
Entrapment, 1 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 2 (2005).   
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scholarship must incorporate policing into its conception of what counts as 
criminal law. 
III. CONDITIONS FOR PUNISHMENT 
Punishment theory occupies a considerable portion—some would 
charge, an oversized portion—of criminal law theorists’ attention.101  
Scholars have developed various accounts of the justification of punishment, 
most drawing upon retributive principles, deterrence considerations, or some 
combination of the two.  Usually, arguments in punishment theory are 
explicitly or implicitly moral rather than political: they tend to appeal to 
moral intuitions or invoke moral principles rather than engage in analysis of 
political actors and institutions.  Punishment theory, like the rest of criminal 
law theory, tends to neglect the state.102  And thus it has neglected the state 
officials who make punishment possible, including the police. 
But punishment—at least, the kind that interests criminal law 
theorists—is a form of state action, and the legitimacy of punishment is a 
question about the legitimacy and limits of state power.  To impose the 
uniquely coercive burdens of punishment, the state must show that it has 
identified and prosecuted a wrongdoer in accordance with certain rules.  In 
this section, I sketch briefly an argument that compliance with rules of 
investigative procedure is a condition for legitimate punishment.103  The 
sketch is probably too brief—and my view too unconventional—to persuade 
many readers to adopt this reading of the law of investigative procedure.  No 
matter. For purposes of this essay, I want only to illustrate that policing 
questions can, and should, be tackled by punishment theorists.104 
As an initial matter, let us rephrase slightly the question of punishment 
theory.  “When [or why, or how] is punishment justified?” is an inquiry that 
reifies punishment.  It treats punishment as an institution already existing in 
the world, and subtly assumes that this institution must be justified one way 
or another.  It obscures the specific agents who choose to punish; indeed, it 
obscures the fact that punishment is a choice.  Suppose we asked instead, 
“Under what conditions may the state impose punishment?”  Now, at least, 
we have a small reminder that punishment is the act of an agent—or rather, 
of multiple agents—and not an impersonal, inevitable event.105  Like other 
 
101  See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 11, at vii (claiming that the philosophy of criminal law 
“had been too dominated by anxieties about the justifiability of punishment”). 
102  See Ristroph, supra note 14, at 1040–43. 
103  I develop this argument at greater length in Alice Ristroph, Conditions of Legitimate 
Punishment, in THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW (Flanders & Hoskins eds., 2016). 
104  For more detailed elaborations of these arguments, see id. and Ristroph, supra note 20. 
105  In emphasizing the agents of punishment, I do not mean to endorse the view that an 
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state actions, punishment is complex; it involves both broad policy choices 
(to enact criminal legislation, for example) and multiple individual judgments 
(by police, prosecutors, judges, and others).  The theorist who seeks to justify 
the end result of these multiple judgments, such as the confinement of a 
person in prison, must recognize the path that has brought the prisoner to her 
penalty. 
Punishment theorists tend to depict the path to punishment as beginning 
with the offense: a person violates a duly enacted criminal statute.  And on 
many accounts, the path ends as soon as it begins.  Guilt is treated as a 
necessary and sufficient condition for punishment.  Certainly that is the 
implication of most retributive claims that punishment is deserved suffering, 
desert being based upon the offense itself.  Consequentialist theories are 
somewhat more demanding, in that they examine not only whether an offense 
was committed but also whether punishment is likely to deter.  But neither 
approach typically examines the enforcement process.106 
As a matter of existing law and longstanding tradition, though, guilt is 
not in fact the only condition for legitimate punishment.  A person who 
engages in prohibited conduct, but who is never prosecuted or convicted, may 
not be punished within the bounds of the law.  Whatever wrongs the target of 
a lynch mob may have committed, we do not view his hanging as an act of 
legitimate punishment.  Similarly, a guilty defendant who violated an invalid 
law—a ban on flag burning, perhaps—is not properly punishable.  A guilty 
defendant whose trial is conducted by a clearly biased judge is not 
punishable.107  The ideal of due process, along with several other specific 
provisions of the Constitution, imposes various conditions on punishment 
that have little to do with guilt.108  Among these conditions are constraints on 
the investigative process.  A guilty defendant may not be punished if the only 
evidence of his crime is a compelled confession.  That is a relatively 
uncontroversial view of the Fifth Amendment, but the same reasoning should 
 
act is properly called punishment only if a designated agent intends it as such.  See Alice 
Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 167–68 (2006). 
106  One commentator has suggested that inattention to procedural matters is almost 
constitutive of retributive theory.  Speaking of Herbert Morris’s well-known “benefits and 
burdens” or “fair play” account of punishment, Jeffrie Murphy wrote: “Although this theory 
does not involve deep notions of inner wickedness, it may still properly be called retributive 
because it is a nonconsequentialist theory of punishment that bases the justification of 
punishment on considerations of justice or (non-procedural) fairness.”  Jeffrie G. Murphy, The 
State’s Interest in Retribution, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 283, 290 (1994).  
107  See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991) (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 
U.S. 510 (1927)). 
108  It does not solve the problem to say that legal guilt is the necessary and sufficient 
condition for punishment, unless we define legal guilt to include a conviction pursuant to the 
rules of both adjudicative and investigative procedure. 
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apply to violations of the Fourth Amendment.  A guilty defendant should not 
be punished if the state cannot prove his crime at all or if the state can prove 
his crime only with evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure.109 
If punishment theorists notice the state at all, they tend to take 
procedural justice for granted: they assume that the criminal prohibition in 
question has been validly enacted, and they assume that the wrongdoer has 
been properly identified, tried, and convicted.110  These assumptions allow 
the theorist to isolate one moment—the moment the sanction is imposed—
and evaluate that action alone.  I am sympathetic to the view that even when 
all conditions of procedural justice are satisfied, the imposition of a coercive 
sanction still needs further justification.  But it is strange that so much 
intellectual energy should be spent on a single moment of the criminal justice 
process and unfortunate that the intellectual talents of criminal law theorists 
have not grappled more extensively with criminal justice as a process. 
None of this should be taken as an effort to turn the attentions of 
theorists away from punishment.  To the contrary, I suggest that punishment 
looms over the criminal justice process from start to finish and that we 
misunderstand the law of policing if we do not acknowledge that.  Elsewhere, 
I have questioned the widespread view that constitutional criminal procedure 
exists primarily to regulate police officers.111  It is more accurate to see 
constitutional challenges to investigative conduct as a form of legally 
sanctioned resistance to punishment: 
The prototypical Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim alleges police misconduct, to be 
sure, but the immediate goal of such a claim is not better policing.  Instead, the 
prototypical claim is an individual’s act of resistance against state coercion: it is an 
effort to avoid punishment by claiming that the state has overstepped its powers.  
Importantly, this act of resistance is itself constitutionally sanctioned by the Bill of 
Rights—even if the defendant is guilty . . . .  Compliance with specified investigative 
procedures is a constitutional requirement to be met before the state may punish.  Thus 
it is open to individual defendants to resist punishment by alleging an unreasonable 
search or seizure, or an unconstitutional interrogation.112 
 
109  See, e.g., Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: 
“Here I Go Down that Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1564 (1996) (“Limits on 
searches and interrogation, like juries and the right to confront adverse witnesses, are only 
means to the larger end of preventing punishment not authorized by judgment rendered after 
a fair trial.”). 
110  See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 106, at 296 (“Once the liberal state had a criminal 
properly in its clutches (i.e., after he has been found guilty of what has properly been made a 
crime) that state would be allowed to punish him in part for those character defects that he 
reveals that are inconsistent with a liberal community.”). 
111  See Ristroph, supra note 20, at 1556–64. 
112  Id. at 1582–83. 
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I should distinguish two strands of my argument here, one of which may 
seem somewhat more palatable than the other.  First, I have suggested that 
adherence to proper investigative procedure is a condition for legitimate 
punishment.  This suggestion directly counters Justice Cardozo’s argument 
that criminals should not go free on the grounds that the constable has 
blundered.113  The idea that non-blundering constables are a prerequisite for 
legitimate punishment will not be embraced by ardent critics of exclusionary 
rules, but this strand of my argument is likely to be accepted by at least some 
theorists of punishment who simply stipulate to just procedures.114  One could 
accept legitimate policing as a condition for legitimate punishment and leave 
it wholly to the state to address any constabulary blunders, perhaps by 
empowering courts to exclude sua sponte illegally seized evidence.  That is 
not the American approach, which allows individual defendants to seek the 
suppression of illegally obtained evidence but also allows defendants to 
waive such claims.  Indeed, American law treats constitutional challenges to 
police conduct as waived or defaulted if the defendant fails to raise them in a 
timely manner.115  This structure underlies the second strand of my argument, 
the one likely to meet even more objection from criminal law theorists: the 
characterization of constitutional challenges to investigative procedure as a 
form of legally sanctioned resistance to punishment. 
For scholars invested in devising justifications for punishment, the 
concept of legal, permissible resistance to punishment will likely provoke 
discomfort.  And in more practical terms, resistance to punishment may invite 
images of violence toward state officials.  But legal resistance is principled 
resistance, and easily distinguished from physical resistance against police 
officers or flight from prosecution.  As I have elaborated elsewhere, 
[o]ne should not be misled if defendants or their beleaguered attorneys sometimes view 
constitutional protections simply as furniture to be thrown in the prosecutor’s path.  A 
motion to suppress unconstitutionally obtained evidence is very different from the many 
illicit ways one might try to avoid conviction and punishment, such as efforts to destroy 
evidence, intimidate witnesses, or bribe state officials.  The Bill of Rights articulates 
principled limitations on the state’s coercive power, and to stand a chance of success 
the defendant who moves to suppress evidence must frame his resistance in terms of 
those principles. . . . 
It is significant, on my account, that several of the Constitution’s limitations on the 
power to punish are framed as individual rights.  Rights are but one of several 
mechanisms to limit state power (and they are not necessarily the most effective 
alternative).  In contrast to structural constraints such as the separation of powers, rights 
 
113  See People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 588 (N.Y. 1926). 
114  See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 106, at 296 (defending punishment once the state has “a 
criminal properly in his clutches”). 
115  See generally Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
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invite an individual, standing alone, to articulate a claim about the appropriate scope of 
state power.  Rights invite principled challenges to the state that are at least initially 
bottom-up rather than top-down (or horizontal); they invite the subjects of the state to 
initiate the mechanism of limitation.116 
Even with these elaborations, I realize that the prospect of resistance to 
punishment, and especially the suggestion that some forms of such resistance 
might be legally authorized, will doubtless draw some critics.  Rights of 
resistance are controversial.117  I offer this brief account of investigative 
procedure as a forum for resistance only to illustrate the potential impact of 
a bigger horizon for criminal law theory.  By considering all of criminal law, 
“substance” and “procedure” together, we are likely to understand better each 
piece of it, and we are likely to appreciate better the challenges of 
justification. Even theorists hostile to a right to resist punishment, such as 
those who advocate a duty to submit to or even facilitate one’s own 
punishment, must defend their views in light of all that goes into the state’s 
efforts to punish, including its investigative methods. 
CONCLUSION 
The sprawling reach of the substantive criminal law has hardly made 
prohibited acts disappear, but it does authorize a vast range of coercive state 
actions.  These coercive state actions inflict considerable harm, often for little 
benefit.  But we may overlook the harms of the criminal law, or confuse its 
purported aspirations with its actual achievements, if we locate the law 
wholly in substantive prohibitions.  Criminal law theorists do just that, 
purporting to offer philosophies of “the criminal law” but excluding policing 
and enforcement as part of the law that they are theorizing.  I have previously 
suggested that this approach “may be the peculiar outlook of people who do 
not often encounter the law in its more prosaic manifestations.”118  The police 
officer is the most prosaic representation of the criminal law, as the then-
Dean of Duke Law School observed in 1934: “Criminal law in a democracy 
is a . . . difficult concept.  By some it is personified in terms of the policeman, 
who is familiarly known to many southern negroes as ‘The Law.’”119  The 
phrase “southern negroes” is dated, but the insight is not: “The Law” is 
constituted by enforcement practices at least as much today as it was a 
century ago.  And racial minorities are still more likely to be the targets of 
 
116  Ristroph, supra note 20, at 1596. 
117  See generally Ristroph, supra note 20; Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in 
Punishment Theory, 97 CAL. L. REV. 601 (2009). 
118   Ristroph, supra note 21, at 160. 
119  Justin Miller, Criminal Law—An Agency for Social Control, 43 YALE L.J. 691, 692 
(1934). 
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that law.  Racial bias in policing is but one of the contemporary criminal 
justice problems to which theorists could be more relevant, if they would 
simply acknowledge all of criminal law. 
 
